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Abstract
We study the coordination of environmental policy within an agreement in the
context of international trade. In an n-country intra-industry trade model,
ﬁrms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good and consumers have a taste
for variety. Governments choose strategically an emission tax and their mem-
bership in an international agreement. We show that only a strong taste for
variety reduces the competition among governments suﬃciently enough to al-
low for some form of policy coordination, though full cooperation will never be
obtained.
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1 Introduction
Reaching a meaningful international agreement on climate change has proved diﬃcult
over the last three decades. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1998, could not even stop
the trend of a continuous increase of greenhouse gas emissions world-wide observed
since the last century. In the most recent round of climate change negotiations
in Paris in December 2015, even though many countries around the world signed
an agreement, it is only based on voluntary pledges of governments, without any
enforcement mechanism in case of non-compliance. Moreover, even if all governments
would deliver on their pledges, global temperature is expected to increase by 2.7-3
degrees Celsius (UNFCCC 2015), much above the widely accepted and recommended
target of limiting the temperature increase by 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius compared
to per-industrial levels.
Scholars in the game-theoretic literature on the formation of self-enforcing inter-
national environmental agreements (IEAs) attribute the diﬃculty in reaching an
eﬀective climate change agreement to strong free-riding incentives. These incen-
tives emerge because any non-signatory can enjoy the environmental beneﬁts from
reduced emissions without incurring any cost. In the absence of supranational au-
thority that could enforce cooperation on climate change, self-enforcing agreements
achieve relatively little. A central ﬁnding of this literature is that either participation
in an agreement is small or if it is large, then the diﬀerence between cooperative and
non-cooperative behavior is small, i.e cooperation does not really matter. Barrett
(1994a) called this the paradox of cooperation.1 For a recent survey of the literature,
including a collection of the most inﬂuential papers over the last two decades, see
Finus and Caparrós (2015).
Another body of literature explaining the slow progress in addressing transboundary
pollution problems, in particular climate change, points at the fear of governments to
loose competitiveness in international trade if they pursue a stricter environmental
policy than other governments (Copeland and Scott Taylor 2005). Based on an
extension of the simple strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985),
strategic environmental policy has been analyzed for instance by Barrett (1994b),
Conrad (1993) and Kennedy (1994). Under Cournot-competition2, Brander and
Spencer have shown that governments have an incentive to subsidies production of
own ﬁrms in order to increase their rent capture. For environmental policy this
means that emission taxes are set below marginal damages (Barrett 1994b). This
result has been modiﬁed in several directions by considering additional components in
governments' welfare function. Adding consumers to such a model lowers equilibrium
1More optimistic results have been derived for instance for modest emission reductions (Barrett
2002 and Finus and Maus 2008) and if countries cooperate on R&D instead of mitigation (Barrett
2006, El-Sayed and Rubio 2014 and Hoel and de Zeeuw 2010).
2Barrett (1994b) has shown that, probably not surprisingly, many of the results reverse if
Bertrand-competition is considered.
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environmental taxes even further because consumers call for larger quantities in
a model of imperfect competition (Kennedy 1994). Similarly, departing from the
assumption of a local pollutant and considering transboundary pollution provides
further incentives to lower environmental taxes. This is because governments have an
incentive to externalize some environmental damages, understanding that domestic
production is substituted by foreign production if heavily taxed, which may even
increase environmental damages if foreign is more dirty than domestic production
(Conrad 1993). Taken together, strategic trade models oﬀer a rich setting to explain
why environmental policies may be distorted, which is also evident from Ulph (1996a
and 1996b), considering also the incentive of ﬁrms to strategically invest in R&D and
by allowing governments to use diﬀerent environmental policy instruments.
Essentially for a long time, both strands of literature have not been integrated. That
is, the IEA literature did not explicitly consider trade and the strategic environmental
policy and trade literature did not allow for the formation of agreements, i.e. it did
not consider the possibility that governments coordinate their policies. Only recently,
Eichner and Pethig produced a series of papers considering both aspects, Eichner and
Pethig (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015), though their trade model is very diﬀerent from
those mentioned above, and hence their results are diﬃcult to relate to this liter-
ature. Eichner and Pethig extend the basic model of international environmental
agreements without trade (Barrett, 1994a) by introducing production, consumption
and international trade. The authors assume composite consumer goods and fossil
fuel goods that are produced and consumed in each country and traded in interna-
tional markets. Furthermore, they assume that consumers face carbon caps imposed
on their consumption of fossil fuel goods. Eichner and Pethig (2012) ﬁnd that sta-
ble coalitions are small and hence ineﬀective in reducing emissions. In Eichner and
Pethig (2013), they consider that the coalition acts like Stackelberg leader. Hence,
in line with Barrett (1994a), they ﬁnd that stable coalitions can belarger. However,
due to emission leakage, equilibrium emissions are only slightly lower than in the
business as usual scenario, rendering the environmental beneﬁts of these coalitions
negligible. Eichner and Pethig (2015) extend their previous analysis by considering
carbon taxes instead of emission caps. They ﬁnd that the grand coalition can be
stable. However, this is only the case if the damages from pollution are low, for
medium to high level of damages, the grand coalition is no longer stable. Thus,
they essentially conﬁrm the paradox of cooperation. The interesting aspect is that
the policy instrument matters for stability. Finally, in Eichner and Pethig (2014)
they consider asymmetric countries and a carbon tax. They consider two types of
asymmetry, in terms of pollution damages and fossil fuel demand. They ﬁnd that
in the case of asymmetric damages, the grand coalition is never stable, unless the
asymmetry as well as the damage levels are very low. In the case of a very high
degree of fuel demand asymmetry, the grand coalition can be stable, but only if fuels
are very scarce worldwide.
In contrast, we oﬀer an IEA-model which is very much in the spirit of the strategic
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environmental policy and trade literature. Our model considers governments which
care for the proﬁts of their ﬁrms, the utility of their consumers and environmental
damages, which are the result of a global pollutant. They choose strategically an
emission tax and their membership in an international agreement. We allow for hor-
izontal product diﬀerentiation where consumers' taste for variety is captured. Thus,
our paper beneﬁts from contributions by Yi (1996) and (2000) and Loke and Win-
ters (2012) who look at international trade, trade agreements and taste for variety,
but who ignore environmental damages and their eﬀect on governments' strategic
behavior.
Adding agreement formation to a strategic trade and environmental model changes
some of the incentives mentioned above. First of all and foremost, members to
an agreement can internalize, at least partially, some of the externalities, aﬀecting
ﬁrms, consumers and environmental damages. To which extent this undertaking is
successful depends on the strategic interaction of environmental policy between sig-
natory and non-signatory countries and the size of stable agreements. Secondly, the
rent capture argument for low taxes is reversed in a game with agreement forma-
tion. Given that taxes are welfare neutral in such type of models (tax bills by ﬁrms
are equal to tax revenues of governments), in a market with oligopolistic competi-
tion, signatory governments have an incentive to enforce a cartel solution for their
ﬁrms, i.e. lowering output in order to increase the market price via an increase in
taxes. Internalizing environmental damages among members to an agreement also
calls for even higher taxes. In contrast, if members to an agreement care for their
consumers suﬃciently enough will they have an incentive to lower their taxes com-
pared to non-members. Overall, our results conﬁrm the predominantly pessimistic
conclusion which has emerged from the IEA-literature. Agreements are small at best
and may not exist at all due to strong free-rider incentives. If consumers have a low
taste for variety, i.e. domestic and foreign varieties are viewed as good substitutes
by consumers, agreement formation fails. Only with a suﬃciently high taste for
variety, strategic interaction of governments is suﬃciently reduced such that small
agreements are stable.
In what follows, section 2 presents our model. Section 3 develops our results, includ-
ing an in-depth analysis of the driving forces of coalition formation and the strategic
interaction between signatories and non-signatories to an agreement. In section 4,
we summarize our main results and conclude.
2 Model
2.1 Payoﬀ Function
Consider an intra-industry trade model with n ex ante symmetric countries with a
representative ﬁrm and consumer in each country. We denote the set of countries by
N . Firms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in diﬀer-
ent varieties where each ﬁrm produces one variety. This good causes environmental
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damages; the production uses emissions as an input, e.g. in the form of energy by
which greenhouse gases are released. Firms compete in a Cournot-fashion. Markets
are segmented and each ﬁrm supplies its good to the domestic and all foreign mar-
kets. Because of the segmentation of markets, ﬁrms play a separate Cournot-game
in each market.3 Transport costs are assumed away as usual.
The welfare of country i is given by:
Wi = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di (1)
where PSi is country i 's producer surplus, TRi is the tax revenue from the emission
tax imposed by the government i on its domestic ﬁrm, CSi represents country i 's
consumer surplus, and Di is the pollution damage faced by country i.
Consumers are identical and their preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility
function over two goods (see equation (2) below). The ﬁrst good is the horizontally
diﬀerentiated and traded good. The second good is a numeraire good, representing
the composition of all other goods. Utility is linear in the numeraire good and
quadratic in the diﬀerentiated good.
We assume that consumers have a taste for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). That
is, their utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed but also on the
composition of quantities of the diﬀerentiated good (Yi, 1996 and 2000). The taste
for variety (abbreviated TFV hereafter) is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] . High
values of γ imply a low taste for variety and for γ = 1 varieties are perfect substitutes.
In contrast, low values of γ represent a high preference for a diverse and balanced
consumption bundle and for γ = 0 varieties cannot be substituted at all.4
More speciﬁcally, let the representative consumer's utility in country i be given by
ui:
ui(qi;Mi) = vi(qi) +Mi = aQi. − γ
2
Q2i. −
1− γ
2
∑
k∈N
q2ik +Mi (2)
where vi represents the utility from consuming the horizontally diﬀerentiated and
traded good and Mi represents the utility from consuming the numeraire good; qi =
(qi1, ..., qin) is a vector of varieties consumed by consumers in country i, with qik
representing country i 's consumption of country k 's variety5; a is a positive demand
parameter and Qi. =
∑
k∈N qik is country i 's total consumption of all varieties,
supplied by all countries k.
3See Appleyard and Field (2014) as well as Helpman and Krugman (1985) for further background.
4An extension could be the ideal variety approach where consumers have not only a general
preference for the variety of a good but also a preference for a particular variety. One application
is a bias towards the domestically produced variety (Di Comite et al, 2014).
5Throughout the paper the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which the variety is consumed
and the second subscript indicates the market in which it is produced.
5
In this paper, in most parts, we will focus our analysis on two extreme TFV scenarios:
the no TFV scenario with γ = 1 and the maximum TFV scenario with γ =
0. This is done for analytic tractability and can be justiﬁed because the driving
forces identiﬁed below for these two extreme assumptions would also be present for
intermediate values, though with diﬀerent degrees.
From (2), country i 's inverse demand function for country k 's variety follows from:
pik =
∂ui
∂qik
⇐⇒ pik = a− (1− γ)qik − γQi. ⇐⇒ pik = a− qik − γ
∑
l∈N, l 6=k
qil (3)
where pik represents the price faced by consumers in country i consuming the variety
of country k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=k qil is the sum of all consumed varieties produced by all
ﬁrms except ﬁrm k in country k.
From (2) and (3) , the consumer surplus in country i is given by :
CSi = aQi. − γ
2
Q2i. −
1− γ
2
∑
k∈N
q2ik −
∑
k∈N
qikpik (4)
where the last term in (4) represents consumers' spending.
The producer surplus of representative ﬁrm i (in country i) is the sum of its proﬁts
in each market:
PSi =
∑
k∈N
piki =
∑
k∈N
qki(pki − c− ti) (5)
where piki is ﬁrm i 's proﬁt in market k from selling quantity qki at price pki where
c is the constant marginal cost and ti is the emission tax imposed by country i 's
government on its ﬁrm's output, which assumes that emissions are linked to quantities
by a constant emission-output coeﬃcient. Without loss of generality, we set this
coeﬃcient to 1. This implies that in this simple model, the tax is de facto an
output tax. Moreover, the tax is an eﬃcient instrument to tackle all externalities
present in this model, as all welfare components depend directly on outputs. Also the
environmental externality is eﬃciently tackled by this tax because the only option
to address environmental externalities is to reduce output. This would be diﬀerent
in richer models (e.g. Conrad 1993) in which ﬁrms can reduce emissions by investing
in a diﬀerent production/abatement technology. Given imperfect competition, the
tax is typically not set equal to marginal damages.
The tax revenue, TRi , is given by:
TRi = ti
∑
k∈N
qki (6)
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and damages from global pollution faced by country i are given by:
Di = δ
∑
i∈N
Qi. (7)
where δ is a damage parameter,
∑
i∈N Qi. is total consumption in every country i
and hence total emissions (due to our assumption of a constant emission output
coeﬃcient of 1). That is, emissions constitute a pure public bad: damages depend
on total emissions.
2.2 Coalition Formation Game
We assume a three-stage coalition formation game, which unfolds as follows.
Stage 1, Choice of Membership: all countries decide simultaneously whether to join
coalition S with m the cardinality of S. Countries which do not join S act as
singletons. A typical signatory will be denoted by i and a non-signatory by j.
Following d'Aspremont et al (1983), a coalition is called stable if it is internally
and externally stable. Internal stability means that no signatory has an incentive
to leave coalition S, whereas external stability means that no non-signatory has an
incentive to join coalition S. We assume for simplicity that in the case of indiﬀerence
a non-signatory joins coalition S.
Internal stability:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ S (8)
External stability:
Wj(S)−Wj(S ∪ {j}) > 0 ∀ j ∈ N \ S. (9)
Stage 2, Choice of Policy Level: all countries choose simultaneously their emission
tax.
• Signatories choose their joint emission tax ti (implemented uniformly in all
signatory countries) in order to maximize the joint welfare of coalition S:
max
ti
∑
i∈S Wi
• Non-signatories choose their individual tax tj in order to maximize their indi-
vidual welfare: max
tj
Wj .
That is, the group of signatories with m members and all n−m non-signatories play
a Nash equilibrium among each other.
Stage 3, Choice of Output: all ﬁrms choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their segmented market outputs by maximizing proﬁts: max
q1i,...,qni
PSi .
That is, ﬁrms play a Nash equilibrium among each other. The game is solved by
backwards induction.
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3 Results
3.1 Third Stage
In this section, we derive results for the third stage. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in market
k is given by piki = qki(pki − c− ti). Substituting the inverse demand function from
equation (3) above, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piki
∂qki
= a−c− ti−(2−γ)qki−γQk. = 0 ⇐⇒ a−c− ti−2qki−γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
qkl = 0 (10)
where Qk. is the total quantity consumed in market k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=i qkl is the sum of all
consumed varieties by consumers in market k from all ﬁrms except from ﬁrm i. It is
easy to see that reaction functions (qki = ri(
∑
l∈N,l 6=i qkl) have a slope of −γ/2. Hence,
the equilibrium is unique; the absolute value of the slope of the reaction function
increases with the taste of variety parameter γ and as γ approaches zero, the strategic
interaction among ﬁrms vanishes. Moreover, it is apparent that a necessary condition
for positive quantities is a > c. Below, we will further develop this non-negativity
condition in order to ensure interior solutions.
Solving the n ﬁrst order conditions in market k simultaneously, gives:6
qki =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n− 2) + 2) + γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=i tl
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) . (11)
Since the tax is imposed on production, the equilibrium quantity of ﬁrm I's variety
is the same in all markets k. It is evident that quantities decrease in own taxes
and increase in foreign taxes. If we already account for the fact of a symmetric
tax equilibrium in stage 2 with all signatories choosing the same tax rate ti and all
non-signatories choose the same tax rate tj (and typically ti 6= tj), then we have for
a signatory's ﬁrm
q∗·i∈S =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + tj(γ(n−m))
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (12)
and for a non-signatory's ﬁrm
q∗·j /∈S =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γmti − tj(γ(m− 1) + 2)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (13)
6In market k we have one ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm i : a) a− c− ti − (2− γ)qki − γQk. = 0
and n− 1 ﬁrst order conditions for all other ﬁrms: b) a− c− tl − (2− γ)qkl − γQk. = 0 . Summing
over all n ﬁrms, we derive aggregate supply: Q∗k. =
n(a−c)−ti−γ
∑
tl
γ(n−1)+2 . Substituting back in a), and
solving for qki gives for instance (11).
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with the total equilibrium consumption in market k, Q∗k. given by:
Q∗k. =
n(a− c)− tj(n−m)−mti
γ(n− 1) + 2 (14)
This leads to the following conclusions.
Proposition 1 - The Eﬀects of Taxes on Equilibrium Quantities
Consider the third stage and a market k. Suppose a coalition S has formed in the
ﬁrst stage and all players have chosen their taxes in stage 2, with all m signatories
choosing ti and all n−m non-signatories choosing tj.
The quantity of ﬁrm i's (j's) variety in a signatory country (non-signatory country)
decreases with the level of signatories' (non-signatories') taxes, ∂qki
∂ti
< 0 (
∂qkj
∂tj
< 0)
and increases with the level of non-signatories' (signatories') taxes, ∂qki
∂tj
> 0 (
∂qkj
∂ti
>
0), except for γ = 0 in which case ∂qki
∂tj
= 0 (
∂qkj
∂ti
= 0). The total quantity in
market k decreases in signatories' and non-signatories taxes,
∂Q∗k.
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Q∗k.
∂tj
< 0
irrespective of γ.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (13) above. Q.E.D.
Thus, quantities produced by a ﬁrm for a particular market are negatively aﬀected
by own taxes and positively aﬀected by foreign taxes. Given that a ﬁrm produces the
same quantities for all markets, also the same holds for total production of a ﬁrm.
Only for the maximum TFV, e.g. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm's output not be aﬀected by the
tax of a foreign government imposed on a foreign ﬁrm. Then, essentially, ﬁrms act
in each segmented market like a monopolist as consumers do not substitute diﬀerent
varieties at all. In other words, ﬁrms do not compete and hence are only aﬀected by
their own government's tax.
The same relationship will hold when considering second stage equilibrium taxes,
with essentially two groups of players. Signatories' taxes inﬂuence non-signatories'
quantities negatively and vice versa, except for γ = 0. Hence, for instance, if gov-
ernments in signatory countries want to boost their ﬁrms proﬁts by subsidizing their
ﬁrms, this will automatically reduce foreign ﬁrms' quantities. However, if they decide
to tax their ﬁrms to reduce total output in order to enforce a cartel solution, then
this objective is only partially achieved because foreign ﬁrm's output will increase. A
similar conﬂict occurs if signatories tax their ﬁrms to reduce environmental damages
because foreign quantities and hence emissions will increase. Only for γ = 0 this
strategic interaction breaks down.
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3.2 Second Stage
In this section, we derive equilibrium taxes in the second stage. In order to analyze
the importance of each welfare component on equilibrium taxes, the driving forces
in our model, the relation to other models in the literature, as well as the impact
on the size of stable agreements in the ﬁrst stage (see subsection 3.3), we choose
a didactically motivated approach and consider three diﬀerent objective functions.
The objective function which corresponds to our welfare function (1) is the last
function listed below. The other objective functions comprise only a subset of welfare
components. In the political economy literature, these objective functions could be
viewed as diﬀerent political support functions. If they do not comprise all welfare
components, this would simply imply that not all interest groups are recognized by
governments.
1. W 1i = PSi + TRi + CSi
2. W 2i = PSi + TRi −Di
3. W 3i = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di
The ﬁrst objective functions ignores environmental damages. The second objective
function ignores the consumer surplus and the third objective function is identical to
our welfare function (1) as mentioned above. For analytic tractability, we henceforth
consider two parameter values of γ, namely the no TFV scenario with γ = 1,
and the maximum TFV scenario with γ = 0. Despite this simpliﬁcation, the ﬁrst
order conditions are huge terms, which cannot displayed here. Therefore, we provide
equilibrium taxes for each objective function in Appendix 1 and provide full details
of the ﬁrst order conditions upon request. This procedure also applies to the further
analysis of equilibrium quantities once equilibrium taxes have been substituted in
stage 3 and equilibrium coalition sizes are determined in stage 1 (See the Appendix).
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium quantities reveals that we need to impose
non-negativity constraints on parameter values in order to ensure positive outputs.
This ensures interior solutions, which are easier to analyze than if we allowed for
boundary solutions. Essentially, these constraints establish an upper bound on the
level of taxes and boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a is larger
than marginal production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. The exact
constraints are stated in Appendix 3, which henceforth are assumed to hold.
We now consider signatories' and non-signatories' taxes across the diﬀerent objec-
tive functions. This will illustrate how diﬀerent welfare components aﬀect equilib-
rium taxes. We denote signatories' equilibrium taxes for objective function 1 by
t∗i (PS, TR,CS), objective function 2 by t
∗
i (PS, TR,D) and of objective function 3
by t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D), and the same applies for non-signatories' equilibrium taxes.
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Proposition 2 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across Diﬀerent Welfare
Scenarios
Assume some coalition with m signatories has formed in the ﬁrst stage and let n >
m > 2.
Signatories' taxes:
• t∗i (PS, TR,D) > t∗i (PS, TR,CSD) > t∗i (PS, TR,CS) for γ = {0, 1}.
Non-signatories' taxes:
For γ = 1:
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) < t∗j(PS, TR,CSD) < t∗j(PS, TR,CS).
For γ = 0:
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) > t∗j(PS, TR,CSD) > t∗j(PS, TR,CS).
Proof: See Appendix 4. Q.E.D.
We ﬁrst note that signatories' equilibrium taxes are lowered when consumers enter
governments' objective function and are increased when instead damages are consid-
ered by governments. The reason is that the consumer surplus is negatively aﬀected
by taxes whereas damages are reduced through taxes. Hence, in terms of equilib-
rium taxes, consumers call for lower and damages for higher equilibrium taxes. In
our model, the larger the damage parameter δ compared to the demand parameter
a the higher will be the tax and vice versa.
For non-signatories, we observe the same ranking as for signatories if γ = 0 because
then the strategic interaction among ﬁrms vanishes. As shown in Proposition 1, if
γ = 0 , quantities only depend on own taxes. In contrast for γ = 1, the strate-
gic interaction among ﬁrms is at its maximum and hence also among governments.
The ranking of equilibrium taxes for the diﬀerent welfare scenarios of non-signatories
is now reversed to those of signatories. For instance, adding damages to objective
function 1 leads to lower equilibrium taxes for non-signatories, already indicating
the strategic interaction among signatories and non-signatories, i.e. non-signatories
free-ride on signatories' emission reduction eﬀorts. This is one version of the free-
rider behavior of non-signatories undermining the formation of large stable coalitions
which will be analyzed in more detail below.
We now turn to comparing signatories' and non-signatories' taxes for each objective
function, which gives rise to further insights into the strategic interaction among
signatories and non-signatories.
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Proposition 3 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes within each Welfare Sce-
nario
Objective Function 1: W 1i = PSi + TRi + CSi
• For γ = 1: t∗i = t∗j < 0; ∂t
∗
i
∂m
= 0 and
∂t∗j
∂m
= 0.
• For γ = 0: t∗i < t∗j < 0; ∂t
∗
i
∂m
< 0 and
∂t∗j
∂m
= 0.
Objective Function 2: W 2i = PSi + TRi −Di
• For γ = 1: t∗i > t∗j ; t∗i >,≤ 0; t∗j < 0; ∂t
∗
i
∂m
> 0 and
∂t∗j
∂m
< 0.
• For γ = 0: t∗i > t∗j > 0; ∂t
∗
i
∂m
> 0 and
∂t∗j
∂m
= 0.
Objective Function 3: W 3i = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di
• For γ = 1: t∗i > t∗j ; t∗i >,≤ 0; t∗j < 0; ∂t
∗
i
∂m
> 0 and
∂t∗j
∂m
< 0.
• For γ = 0: t∗i > t∗j > 0 and ∂t
∗
i
∂m
> 0 if δm + c ≤ a < 2nδ + c; t∗i ≤ t∗j ≤ 0 and
∂t∗i
∂m
≤ 0 if a ≥ 2δn+ c; ∂t∗j
∂m
= 0.
Taken together:7
Objective Functions
Direction of Change Strategic Interaction
γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi + CSi 0 , 0 ↓, 0 independent independent
PSi + TRi −Di ↑,↓ ↑, 0 substitutes independent
PSi + TRi + CSi −Di ↑,↓ ↑↓,0 substitutes independent
Proof: See Appendix 1,2, 3 and 5. Q.E.D.
There are at least two interesting aspects in Proposition 3. The ﬁrst aspect relates
to the comparison between signatories' and non-signatories' equilibrium taxes where
the former internalize externalities within their group. The second aspect relates
to the strategic interaction between signatories' and non-signatories' taxes when the
coalition is enlarged.
7The ﬁrst column Direction of Change, illustrates how signatories' and non-signatories' taxes
change with the coalition size. The ﬁrst entry (arrow) relates to signatories' taxes and the second
to non-signatories' ones. An entry of 0 for signatories means that there is no need for coordina-
tion among players. The second column Strategic Interaction illustrates the strategic interaction
between signatories' and non-signatories' taxes. Intuition would suggest that in terms of forming
stable coalitions, for a given objective function, this will be easier if taxes are independent than if
they are strategic substitutes.
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For the ﬁrst objective function without environmental damages, signatories and non-
signatories subsidize production. In principle, there are two externalities for this
objective function in this imperfect competition model. Firms produce more than
the monopoly quantity (at least if γ 6=0), but consumers would like to consume more
than the Cournot-Nash quantity and certainly more than the monopoly quantity.
Thus, consumers call for low taxes, even subsidies, and from signatory governments'
perspective ﬁrms' revenues call for high taxes in order to enforce a cartel solution
with lower quantities. Though taxes reduce ﬁrms proﬁts, the government collects
these taxes and hence taxes are welfare neutral in this model. This last mechanism
is diﬀerent from the Brander and Spencer model but also other strategic environment
and trade papers for two reasons. In the Brander and Spencer model foreign gov-
ernments are not allowed to react and hence the government subsidies production in
order to shift rents to domestic ﬁrms. Moreover, which also applies to other environ-
ment and trade models, which allow foreign governments to react, as long as there
is no agreement formation among governments, governments cannot enforce a cartel
solution. In our model, signatory governments have this possibility and incentive.
For γ = 1, in our model, these two externalities are going in opposite directions, just
cancel out, which explains why t∗i = t
∗
j and why taxes/subsidies do not change with
the size of the coalition. For γ = 0, each ﬁrm acts like a monopolist it its market and
hence signatory governments do not need to enforce a cartel solution for their ﬁrms.
In fact, quantities are too low from the perspective of consumers, which explains
why signatory governments would choose a higher subsidy than non-signatory gov-
ernments, the former internalize the externality for their consumers. In other words,
there is a positive externality from subsidizing consumption.
For the second objective function, which ignores consumers but considers environ-
mental damages, signatories choose a higher tax than non-signatories in order to
internalize the negative externality stemming from emissions. For γ = 0 when there
is no competition among ﬁrms, both governments choose a positive tax, though sig-
natory governments choose a higher tax than non-signatory governments. For γ = 1,
with a maximum of strategic interaction among ﬁrms, there is the possibility (de-
pending on the parameter values) that signatory governments may choose a negative
tax if the number of signatories is small (see Appendix 1). This is because of the
trade-oﬀ between enforcing a cartel solution and internalizing environmental dam-
ages on the one hand, and the fear of losing competitiveness through higher taxes on
the other hand. The latter aspect is particular relevant if an agreement is small and
hence the number of free-riders is large. This free-rider behavior is apparent from
the fact that non-signatory governments always subsidies their ﬁrms for γ = 1, this
subsidy increases with the size of the coalition, i.e.
∂t∗j
∂m
< 0 and subsidies are higher
than signatory governments' subsidies if they choose subsidies and not a tax. Thus,
in a strategic context, even if environmental damages are considered by governments,
competition among ﬁrms may imply a subsidy and not a tax in equilibrium, but sig-
natory governments choose a lower subsidy than non-signatory governments and in
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most cases they tax.
The third objective function, including all welfare components, combines the driving
forces described for the ﬁrst and second objective function. For γ = 1, this means
that signatories have a higher tax than non-signatories, non-signatories always choose
a subsidy and non-signatories may choose a tax or a subsidy, which in the latter case
only happens if the agreement is small (see Appendix 1). For γ = 0, when govern-
ments do not need to fear competition for their ﬁrms, signatory governments need
only to balance consumers' and environmental interests. If damages are suﬃciently
large (represented by the parameter δ) compared to consumers demand (represented
by the parameter a) signatory governments will choose a tax and if this is reversed,
they may choose a subsidy. In the former case, signatory governments' taxes increase
with the coalition size, in the latter case, their subsidies increase with the coalition
size.
The second aspect of Proposition 3 is the strategic interaction between signatories'
and non-signatories' taxes. In the case of maximum TFV with γ = 0, signatories'
and non-signatories' taxes are strategically independent. Non-signatories' taxes do
not change with the coalition size m due to the independence of varieties. Signato-
ries' taxes are either increasing or decreasing with the coalition size depending on
the relative strength of the externality which they are internalizing. For objective
function 1 (2) signatories' taxes decrease (increase) with the coalition size because
because of the positive externality on consumers (damages). Objective function 3
combines the eﬀects of objective function 1 and 2 and hence signatories' taxes de-
crease with the coalition size if the demand parameter a is suﬃciently large compared
to marginal production costs and global marginal damages and increase if this rela-
tion is reversed. In the case of no TFV with γ = 1, signatories' and non-signatories'
taxes are strategic substitutes for most objective functions where signatories' taxes
are increasing with the coalition size m whereas non-signatories' taxes are decreas-
ing. The exception is the ﬁrst objective function because externalities cancel out for
γ = 1.
3.3 Properties of the Coalition Game
In this section, we analyze some general properties of our coalition game, which
will be helpful in order to understand the normative and positive properties of our
coalition game. The positive properties also help to understand the size of stable
agreements in the ﬁrst stage of our game, which we derive in Subsection 3.4.
We deﬁne the following properties to analyze the incentive structure to form coali-
tions and the associated welfare implications.
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For all n ≥ m ≥ 2:
• Superadditivity: a coalition game is (strictly) superadditive if:
mWi∈S(m) ≥ (>)(m− 1)Wi∈S(m− 1) +Wj /∈S((m− 1) .
• Positive Externality: a coalition game exhibits a (strict) positive externality
if:
Wj /∈S(m) ≥ (>)Wj /∈S(m− 1).
• Full Cohesiveness: a coalition game is (strictly) fully cohesive if:
mWi∈S(m)+ (n−m)Wj /∈S(m) ≥ (>)(m−1)Wi∈S(m−1)+(n−m+1)Wj /∈S(m−1) .
Superadditivity provides an incentive to join a coalition whereas the positive exter-
nality captures the incentive to free-ride. In terms of forming large stable coalitions,
the two properties work in opposite directions and typically for large coalitions the
positive externality eﬀect is stronger than the superadditivity eﬀect. Full cohesive-
ness justiﬁes the search for large stable coalitions, even if the grand coalition is not
stable. Essentially, global welfare increases when the coalition is enlarged gradually
and obtains its maximum in the grand coalition.
Proposition 4 - Properties of the Coalition Game
In the coalition game, the properties positive externality and full cohesiveness hold
strictly for each of the the three objective functions whenever there is an externality
across players. For objective function 1 and γ = 1 when there is no externality across
players, these properties hold weakly.
For all objective functions, superadditivity holds for γ = 0 and fails for γ = 1 when-
ever there is an externality across players. For γ = 1 it only holds for the move from
a coalition with n−1 signatories to the grand coalition with n signatories. For objec-
tive function 1 and γ = 1 when there is no externality across players, superadditivity
holds weakly. More speciﬁcally:8
Objective Functions
Positive Externality Superadditivity Full Cohesiveness
γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi + CSi 0 + 0 + 0 +
PSi + TRi −Di + + − + + +
PSi + TRi + CSi −Di + + − + + +
8Legend: += holds strictly, 0= holds weakly, and - does not hold generally.
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Proof: See Appendix 6. Q.E.D.
Clearly, for objective function 1 and γ = 1 these properties are meaningless as exter-
nalities cancel out. Proposition 4 conﬁrms that the normative property of the game
full cohesiveness holds. The larger are coalitions, the larger will be global welfare. It
also conﬁrms that non-signatories beneﬁt from the enlargement of the coalition via
positive externalities. This provides an incentive to free-ride. Interestingly, the in-
centive to join a coalition, captured by the property superadditivity, is only positive
if γ = 0 but is negative if γ = 1 and whenever coalition formation would matter (i.e.
full cohesiveness strictly holds). In the latter case, signatories' taxes increase with
the coalition size and the reverse is true for non-signatories as shown in Proposition
3. That is, strategies are substitutes, and hence the eﬀorts of signatories are un-
dermined by non-signatories' reaction. This countervailing or leakage eﬀect renders
the enlargement of the coalition not successful. As recently shown in Bayramoglu,
Finus and Jacques (2016), if the move from a coalition with m− 1 to m members is
not superadditive, then the coalition with m signatories cannot be internally stable.
In other words, superadditivity is a necessary (though not suﬃcient) condition for
internal stability in a positive externality game. Hence, if superadditivity fails for all
m ≤ n − 1 for γ = 1, we only need to test for stability of the grand coalition. Our
overall results are summarized in Proposition 5 below, which looks at the stability
of coalitions in the ﬁrst stage.
3.4 First Stage
In this section, we present the results for the ﬁrst stage, i.e. the stability of coalitions.
Proposition 5 - Coalition Stability
Let m∗ denote the size of an internally and externally stable coalition and let n > 5.
For the three objective functions, whenever there is an incentive for countries to
coordinate their policy (i.e.
∂t∗i
∂m
6= 0), the following results are obtained:
For γ = 1: m∗ = 1 and for γ = 0: m∗ = 3.
More speciﬁcally:
Objective Functions
I&ES
γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi + CSi - m
∗ = 3
PSi + TRi −Di m∗ = 1 m∗ = 3
PSi + TRi + CSi −Di m∗ = 1 m∗ = 3
Proof: See Appendix 7. Q.E.D.
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Proposition 5 shows that if γ = 1 there are no stable coalitions, except for objective
function 1 for which coalition formation is meaningless as externality across players
cancels out. This can be related to two previous results. In Proposition 3 we showed
that taxes are strategic substitutes, and in Proposition 4 we showed that this implied
that superadditivity generally failed.
In contrast, if γ = 0 there is at least a stable coalition of three countries. This can
also be inferred from our previous results. In Proposition 3 we showed that taxes
are strategically independent in these scenarios, and in Proposition 4 we showed that
superadditivity holds. However, interestingly, despite superadditivity holds, stable
coalitions are small because of the positive externality property.9
It is interesting that these results hold for both values of γ irrespective of the weight
consumers and damages receive in governments' s objective function, which stresses
that they are quite robust. Even considering consumers' interests apart from envi-
ronmental damages in governments' objective function do not mitigate the free-rider
incentives suﬃciently enough, and hence the establishment of a stable agreement is
diﬃcult. Only if the competition among ﬁrms is suﬃciently reduced through a high
taste for variety by consumers, can small agreements be stable (see also the previous
footnote). Thus, in relating our results to the strategic environment and trade liter-
ature without coalition formation, their main conclusions remain valid for γ = 1 as
no stable agreement forms when allowing for this possibility. However, if the taste
for variety is suﬃciently strong, more positive results can be obtained, even though
the normative benchmark of the social optimum will not be obtained.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed a strategic trade model in the spirit of Brander and
Spencer (1985). We introduced three additional features, which have been considered
in the literature, though in isolation. Firstly, consumers matter for governments be-
cause goods are not sold to a third market. Moreover, environmental damages matter
because production releases a global pollutant. Second, we consider horizontal prod-
uct diﬀerentiation with consumers having a taste for variety (TFV). For analytical
tractability, we focused on two extreme assumptions of TFV: no TFV and maximum
TFV where the former assumption corresponds to the standard assumption in the
literature that goods are perfect substitutes. These two extreme assumptions were
suﬃcient because the driving forces identiﬁed would also be present for intermedi-
ate cases. Thirdly, we considered the possibility that governments can coordinate
their policy by forming coalitions, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
considered in the literature so far. Policy coordination is related to an emission tax,
9It is probably not surprising that for intermediate values of γ between 0 and 1, one ﬁnds that
the equilibrium coalition size lies between m∗ = 1 and m∗ = 3. Fo instance, for γ = 0.5 we ﬁnd
m∗ = 2.
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which is de facto an output tax because of a constant output-emission ratio. In our
simple model this tax is eﬃcient as ﬁrms have no option to switch to a more envi-
ronmentally friendly technology. Stability of a coalition leading to an agreement was
tested by invoking the concept of internally and externally stable cartels.
We demonstrated that the formation of agreements is globally beneﬁcial. Global
welfare increases with the size of agreements and obtains its maximum if the grand
coalition forms (full cohesiveness). However, the grand coalition or even smaller
coalitions may not be stable because of two reasons. Firstly, the beneﬁts from policy
coordination are non-exclusive, a features which we related to the property of positive
externality of coalition formation. Secondly, the gains from cooperation for those
involved in enlarging coalitions may be small or even negative if policy instruments
are strategic substitutes. That is, superadditivity may fail.
We showed that for the no TFV scenario, signatories of an agreement increase
their taxes with the size of the agreement. Signatory governments have an incentive
to internalize two negative externalities, both associated with high quantities. A
reduction of output stabilizes the price in the output cartel and also reduces envi-
ronmental damages. Non-signatories free-ride on signatories' eﬀorts and lower their
taxes. Hence, taxes are strategic substitutes between signatories and non-signatories.
In our model, this meant that no agreement was stable. In contrast, for the max-
imum TFV scenario, foreign taxes have no eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms' output. In
the context of an agreement, this implies that taxes of signatories (non-signatories)
have no eﬀect on the output of non-signatories' (signatories') ﬁrms. We found that
this implies that taxes between signatories and non-signatories become strategically
independent. Regardless whether signatories increase or decrease their tax with the
size of the agreement, non-signatories' equilibrium taxes do not change. This reduces
the free-rider incentive, but it remains positive, which explains that this led only to
small stable coalitions.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce consumers' taste for variety
to the literature of international environmental agreements and trade. Our stylized
model allows for exploring future research avenues in terms of additional policy
instruments, like tax border adjustments Helm and Schmidt 2015), relaxing the
symmetry assumption and further investigations of sub-features of TFV, such as
ideal varieties or asymmetric consumers' TFV between countries.
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5 Appendixes
A detailed appendix with the full details of all derivations is available upon request.
Below, we summarize the most important steps in the derivation in a compact form
for γ = 1 and γ = 0.
5.1 Appendix 1: Equilibrium Taxes for all Objective Func-
tions
For each scenario, we derive the F.O.C.s for signatories and non-signatories in stage
2 of the game. Solving these conditions simultaneously, we ﬁnd the equilibrium
taxes for signatories and non-signatories (for which the signs follow from using the
non-negativity constraints derived in Appendix 3).
• For γ = 1:
t∗i (PS, TR,CS) = t
∗
j(PS, TR,CS) = −
a− c
n
< 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D) =
δ[n(m(n−m+ 3)− n− 1) +m(2−m)]− (a− c)(n− 2m+ 1)
m(n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2) > 0, ≤ 0
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t∗j(PS, TR,D) = −
δ(m− 2)(n+ 1) + (a− c)(n− 1)
n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2 < 0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) =
nδ[m(2−m) + n(n(m− 1) +m(3−m)− 1)]−m(a− c)(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
mn(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1)) > 0, ≤0
t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) = −
nδ(m− 2)(n+ 1) + (a− c)(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
n(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1)) < 0
• For γ = 0:
t∗i (PS, TR,CS) = −
(a− c)m
2n−m < 0
t∗j(PS, TR,CS) = −
a− c
2n− 1 < 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D) = δm > 0
t∗j(PS, TR,D) = δ > 0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) =
(2nδ − a+ c)m
2n−m > 0, ≤0
t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
2nδ − a+ c
2n− 1 > 0, ≤0
5.2 Appendix 2: Deﬁnitions
There are certain terms that repeatedly show up in the following. They are listed
below.
Ψ1 = n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2 = n2 − nm+ n−m+ 2
Ψ2 = n
2 + (1−m)(n+ 1) = n2 − nm+ n−m+ 1
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Ψ3 = n
2(m− 1)− n(m− 1)2 −m(m− 2) = n2m− n2 − nm2 + 2nm− n−m2 + 2m
Ψ4 = n(m− 1)−m(m− 2) = nm− n−m2 + 2m
Ψ5 = (m− 2)(n+ 1) = mn+m− 2n− 2
Ψ6 = (m− 1)(n+ 1) = mn+m− n− 1
Ψ7 = (n−m)(n−m+ 1)−m(1−m) + 2 = n2 − 2nm+ 2m2 + n− 2m+ 2
Ψ8 = n(n
2+n+1)−2nm(n−m+1)+m2 = n3−2n2m+2nm2+n2−2nm+m2+n
It can be shown that all Ψk > 0, ∀n and ∀m ≤ n.
5.3 Appendix 3: Non-negativity Constraints
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium output levels, gives the quantities be-
low, from which it is evident that for the ﬁrst objective function no non-negativity
constraint needs to be imposed apart from a > c. For the second and third objective
function, additional conditions need to be imposed as explained below.
• For γ = 1:
q∗.i(PS, TR,CS) = q
∗
.j(CS, PS, TR) =
a− c
n
q∗.i(PS, TR,D) =
(a− c)(n−m+ 1)− δΨ3
mΨ1
q∗.j(PS, TR,D) =
n(a− c) + δ(n(m− 1) +m− 2)
Ψ1
q∗.i(PS, TR,CS,D) =
(a− c)
n
− Ψ3δ
mΨ2
q∗.j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
(a− c)
n
+
δn(n(m− 1) +m− 2)
nΨ2
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• For γ = 0:
q∗.i(PS, TR,CS) =
n(a− c)
2n−m
q∗.j(PS, TR,CS) =
n(a− c)
2n− 1
q∗.i(PS, TR,D) =
a− c− δm
2
q∗.j(PS, TR,D) =
a− c− δ
2
q∗.i(PS, TR,CS,D) =
n(a− c− δm)
2n−m
q∗.j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
n(a− c− δ)
2n− 1
For the second and third objective function, the following non-negativity constraints
need to be imposed.
• Objective Function 2: W 2i = PSi + TRi −Di
 For γ = 1 signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜1 =
δΨ3
n−m+1 + c, and for non-signatories by a > c, with a˜1 > c.
 For γ = 0 signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜2 =
δm+ c, and for non-signatories by a > a˜3 = δ + c, with a˜2 > a˜3.
• Objective Function 3: W 3i = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di
 For γ = 1 signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜4 =
δnΨ3
mΨ2
+ c, and for non-signatories by a > c, with a˜4 > a˜2.
 For γ = 0 the non-negativity constraints are the same as for the second
objective function above (a > a˜2 for signatories and a > a˜3 for non-
signatories).
It is is straightforward to show that a˜1 > a˜4. Throughout the whole paper, we as-
sume the most restrictive constraint to hold for comparison for a particular objective
function and across objective functions, noting that n ≥ m ≥ 2.
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5.4 Appendix 4: Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across Dif-
ferent Objective Functions
Assume n ≥ m > 2 and the appropriate non-negativity constraints in section 5.3 to
hold. Then, using equilibrium taxes in section 5.1, and the deﬁnitions in section 5.2,
we ﬁnd:
For γ = 1:
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) =
(n+ 1)Ψ4
mΨ1
(
a− c
n
− δ
Ψ2
)
> 0
t∗j(PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) = −
(m− 2)(n+ 1)
Ψ1
(
a− c
n
− δ
Ψ2
)
<0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS)− t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) = −
δ(n+ 1)Ψ4
mΨ2
< 0
t∗j(PS, TR,CS)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
δΨ5
Ψ2
> 0
For γ = 0:
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) =
m(a− c− δm)
2n−m > 0
t∗j(PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
a− c− δ
2n− 1 > 0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS)− t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D) = −
2nmδ
2n−m < 0
t∗j(PS, TR,CS)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) = −
2nδ
2n− 1 < 0
25
5.5 Appendix 5: Comparing Equilibrium Taxes for Each Ob-
jective Function
Using equilibrium taxes as listed in section 5.1, and the deﬁnitions in section 5.2, we
ﬁnd:
For γ = 1:
t∗i (PS, TR,CS)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS) = 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,D) =
Ψ6(nδ + a− c)
mΨ1
> 0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
nδΨ6
mΨ2
> 0
For γ = 0:
t∗i (PS, TR,CS)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS) = −
2n(a− c)(m− 1)
(2n−m)(2n− 1) < 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,D) = δ(m− 1) > 0
t∗i (PS, TR,CS,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,CS,D) =
2n(2nδ − a+ c)(m− 1)
(2n−m)(2n− 1)
which is positive if δm + c < a ≤ 2nδ + c (where δm + c < a is the non-negativity
constraint) and negative if a > 2nδ + c.
Furthermore:
For γ = 1:
∂t∗i (PS,TR,CS)
∂m
= 0
∂t∗j (PS,TR,CS)
∂m
= 0
∂t∗i (PS,TR,D)
∂m
= (n+1)(nδ+a−c)Ψ7
m2Ψ21
> 0
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∂t∗j (PS,TR,D)
∂m
= − (n+1)(n−1)(nδ+a−c)
Ψ21
< 0
∂t∗i (PS,TR,CS,D)
∂m
= δ(n+1)Ψ8
m2Ψ22
> 0
∂t∗j (PS,TR,CS,D)
∂m
= − δ(n+1)(n2−n−1)
Ψ22
< 0
For γ = 0:
∂t∗i (PS,TR,CS)
∂m
= − 2n(a−c)
(2n−m)2 < 0
∂t∗j (PS,TR,CS)
∂m
= 0
∂t∗i (PS,TR,D)
∂m
= δ > 0
∂t∗j (PS,TR,D)
∂m
= 0
∂t∗i (PS,TR,CS,D)
∂m
= 2n(2nδ−a+c)
(2n−m)2
which is positive if δm+ c < a ≤ 2nδ + c (where δm+ c < a is the non-negativity
constraint) and negative if a > 2nδ + c.
∂t∗j (PS,TR,CS,D)
∂m
= 0
5.6 Appendix 6: Properties of the Coalition Game10
Objective Function 1: W 1i = PSi + TRi + CSi:
• For γ = 1:
PEP = 0
SAD = 0
FC = 0
10Legend: PEP: positive externality property, SAD: superadditivity, FC: full cohesiveness.
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• For γ = 0:
PEP =
1
2
(32n3 +m(n(−28n+ 8m)−m2 +m− 1))(m− 1)n2(a− c)2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 > 0
SAD =
1
2
(4n2m− 4nm2 +m3 + 8nm− 3m2 − 8n+ 3m)(m− 1)n2(a− c)2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m) > 0
FC follows from PEP and SAD.
Objective Function: 2 W 2i = PSi + TRi −Di:
• For γ = 1:
PEP =
(nδ + a− c)2(2n2 − 2nm+ 3n− 2m+ 5)(n+ 1)n2
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0
SAD =
−(nδ + a− c)
2(n4 − 2n3m+ n2m2 + nm)(n+ 1)n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2
−(nδ + a− c)
2(−m2 − 4n+ 3m− 1)(n+ 1)n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0, m = n, & < 0 ∀m < n
FC =
(nδ + a− c)2(n3 − 2n2m+ nm2 + 2n2 − 3nm+m2 + 3n− 3m+ 1)(n+ 1)2n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0
• For γ = 0:
PEP = n(m− 1)δ2 > 0
SAD =
1
4
n(m− 1)mδ2 > 0
FC follows from PEP and SAD.
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Objective Function 3 W 3i = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di:
• For γ = 1:
PEP =
1
2
δ2(2n2 − 1)(2n2 − 2nm+ 3n− 2m+ 3)(n+ 1)n2
(n2 −Ψ5)2Ψ22
> 0
SAD = −1
2
δ2(2n5 − 4n4m+ 2n3m2 − 4n3 + 8n2m)(n+ 1)n2
(n2 −Ψ5)2Ψ22
−
1
2
δ2(−4nm2 − 8n2 + 9nm− 2m2 − 4n+ 3m)(n+ 1)n2
(n2 −Ψ5)2Ψ22
> 0, m = n, & < 0,∀m < n
FC =
1
2
δ2(2n3 − 4n2m+ 2nm2 + 4n2 − 6nm+ 2m2 + 4n− 4m+ 1)(n+ 1)2n3
(n2 −Ψ5)2Ψ22
> 0
• For γ = 0:
PEP =
1
2
(nδ − a+ c)2(32n3 − 28n2m+ 8nm2 −m3 +m2 −m)(m− 1)n2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 > 0
SAD =
1
2
(nδ − a+ c)2(4n2m− 4nm2 +m3 + 8nm− 3m2 − 8n+ 3m)(m− 1)n2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 > 0
FC follows from PEP and SAD.
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5.7 Coalition Stability
Objective Function 1 W 1i = PSi + TRi + CSi:
• For γ = 1:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) = 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wj(S \ {i}) =
−1
2
n2(a− c)2(m− 1)(2nm−m2 − 6n+ 3m− 1)
(2n− 1)(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m) > 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0,∀m > 3
Objective Function 2 W 2i = PSi + TRi −Di:
• For γ = 1
Wi(S)−Wj(S\{i}) = −n(nδ + a− c)
2(n+ 1)(n4m− 2n3m2 + n2m3 − n4 + 4n3m)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 −
n(nδ + a− c)2(n+ 1)(−5n2m2 + 2nm3 − 4n3 + 13n2m− 10nm2)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 −
n(nδ + a− c)2(n+ 1)(m3 − 10n2 + 17nm− 7m2 − 12n+ 15m− 9)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 < 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) = −1
4
nδ2(m− 1)(m− 3) ≥ 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0, ∀m > 3
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Objective Function 3 W 3i = PSi + TRi + CSi −Di:
• For γ = 1:
Wi(S)−Wj(S\{i}) = −1
2
δ2n2(n+ 1)(2n5m− 4n4m2 + 2n3m3 − 2n5 + 8n4m− 10n3m2)
mΨ22(n
2 −Ψ5)2 −
1
2
δ2n2(n+ 1)(4n2m3 − 8n4 + 22n3m− 16n2m2 + 2nm3 − 16n3)
mΨ22(n
2 −Ψ5)2 −
1
2
δ2n2(n+ 1)(28n2m− 12nm2 − 16n2 + 19nm− 2m2 − 8n+ 3m)
mΨ22(n
2 −Ψ5)2 < 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wj(S \ {i}) =
−1
2
n2(2nδ − a+ c)2(m− 1)(2nm−m2 − 6n+ 3m− 1)
(2n− 1)(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m) > 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0,∀m > 3.
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